PhilPapers page with links to papers.

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• Why the Manipulation Argument Fails: Determinism Does Not Entail Perfect Prediction (=with Oisin Deery). Forthcoming in Philosophical Studies.
• A painful message: Testing the effects of suffering and understanding on punishment judgments (with 1^st author Eyal Aharoni, David Simpson, and Mario Gollwitzer). Forthcoming in Zeitschrift für Psychologie.
• The Experience of Free Will (with 1^st author Oisin Deery). Forthcoming in A Companion to Free Will, ed. by J. Campbell (Wiley-Blackwell).
• When Do Robots Have Free Will? Exploring the Relationships between (Attributions of) Consciousness and Free Will (with Corey Allen and Bradley Loveall). In Free Will, Causality, and Neuroscience, ed, by B. Feltz, M. Missal and A. Sims (Brill, 2019).
• Social Anxiety and Social Behavior: A Test of Predictions From an Evolutionary Model (with 1st author Erin Tone, and Sarah Brosnan, Roger Bakeman, and Elizabeth Schroth). Clinical Psychological Science 7(1): 110-126, 2019.
• Social Feedback Modulates Neural Response Associated With Cognitive Bias in Individuals Expressing Anxious Symptoms (with 1^st author Khalil Thompson, and Kendrick King, Trevor Kvaran, Negar Fani, Erin Tone, and Jessica Turner). Chronic Stress 3: 1-12, 2019.
• Defeating Manipulation Arguments: Interventionist Causation and Compatibilist Sourcehood (=with Oisin Deery). Philosophical Studies 174(5): 1255-1276, May 2017.
  
• Free Will as a Psychological Accomplishment. In D. Schmidtz and C. Pavel (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Freedom. (Oxford University Press, 2018), 492-507.
• Your Brain as the Source of Free Will Worth Wanting: Understanding Free Will in the Age of Neuroscience. In G. Caruso and O. Flanagan (ed.), Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, Morals, and Purpose in the Age of Neuroscience (Oxford University Press, 2018), 251-268.
• Communicative Theories of Punishment and the Impact of Apology and Recidivism. (= with Eyal Aharoni). In Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass Incarceration, ed. by Chris Surprenant (Routledge, 2017), 144-161.
• ‘Local Determination’, Even If We Could Find It, Does Not Challenge Free Will: Commentary on Marcelo Fischborn (= with Adina Roskies). Philosophical Psychology 30 (1-2): 185-197, 2017.
• Is Free Will an Illusion? Confronting Challenges from the Modern Mind Sciences.  In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, vol. 4: Freedom and Responsibility. MIT Press, 2014, pp. 1-25.
• It’s OK if ‘My Brain Made Me Do It’: People’s Intuitions about Free Will and Neuroscientific Prediction. (=with Jason Shepard and Shane Reuter). Cognition 133(2): 502-516, Nov 2014.
• Why do Women Leave Philosophy? Surveying Students at the Introductory Level. (with primary author Morgan Thompson and Toni Adleberg & Sam Sims). Philosophers’ Imprint 16(6): 1-36, March 2016.
• Explaining Away Incompatibilist Intuitions. (=with Dylan Murray). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88(2): 434-467, March 2014.
• A Naturalistic Vision of Free Will. (with Morgan Thompson). In Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy, ed. by E. Machery and E. O’Neill (Routledge, 2014), 86-103.
• The Free Will Inventory: Measuring Beliefs about Agency and Responsibility. (with primary author Thomas Nadelhoffer, and Chandra Sripada, Jason Shepard & Lisa Ross). In Consciousness & Cognition 25: 27-41.
• Do Men and Women Have Different Philosophical Intuitions? Further Data. (with primary authors Toni Adelberg and Morgan Thompson). Philosophical Psychology 28(5), 2015.
• Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science 3: 439-449, July/August 2012.
• Why ‘Willusionism’ Leads to ‘Bad Results’: Comments on Baumeister et al. Neuroethics 4(1): 17-24, April 2011.
• Intuitions about Free Will, Determinism, and Bypassing. In The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 2nd Edition, ed. by Robert Kane (OUP, 2011), 555-576.
• Scientific Challenges to Free Will.  In A Companion to Philosophy of Action. eds. O’Connor and Sandis. (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010).
• Experimental Philosophy on Free Will:  An Error Theory for Incompatibilist Intuitions. (with Dylan Murray). In New Waves in Philosophy of Action, ed. by J. Aguilar, A. Buckareff, and K. Frankish (Palgrave-Macmillan, 2010), 189-215.
• The Psychology of Free Will (unpublished).
• Free Will as Knowledge (unpublished talk).
• The State of the Free Will Debate: From Frankfurt Cases to the Consequence Argument (unpublished).
• Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Mechanism: Experiments on Folk Intuitions. (with Justin Coates and Trevor Kvaran). Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31: 214-242, 2007.
• Is Incompatibilism Intuitive? (=with Stephen Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer & Jason Turner). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73(1): 28-53, 2006.
• The Past and Future of Experimental Philosophy. (=with Thomas Nadelhoffer). Philosophical Explorations 10(2): 123-149, 2007.
• Close Calls and the Confident Agent. Philosophical Studies 131(3): 627-667, 2006.
• Autonomous Agency and Social Psychology. (In Cartographies of the Mind. eds. Maraffa, De Caro and Ferretti. Springer, 2007).
• Are the Folk Agent Causationists?  (=with Jason Turner). Mind and Language 21(5): 597-609, 2006.
• Folk Fears about Freedom and Responsibility. Journal of Cognition and Culture 6(1-2): 215-237, 2006.
• Agency, Authorship, and Illusion.Consciousness and Cognition 14(4): 771-785, 2005.
• Surveying Freedom. (=with Stephen Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer & Jason Turner). Philosophical Psychology 18(5): 561-584, October 2005.
• The Phenomenology of Free Will. (with Stephen Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer & Jason Turner). Journal of Consciousness Studies 11(7-8): 162-179, 2004.
• When Consciousness Matters: A critical review of The Illusion of Conscious Will. Philosophical Psychology 15(4): 527-541, 2002.
• Verbal Reports on the Contents of Consciousness.Psyche: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Consciousness, 8(21), 2002.
• Is Human Intelligence an Adaptation? Cautionary Observations from the Philosophy of Biology. (with Owen Flanagan and Valerie Hardcastle). In The Evolution of Intelligence, ed. by R. Sternberg and J. Kaufman (Lawrence Erlbaum, 2001).
• Darwin’s Continuum and the Building Blocks of Deception. (with Güven Güzeldere & Rob Deaner). In The Cognitive Animal. eds. Allen, Bekoff and Burghardt.  MIT Press, 2002).

Edited Volumes

• Moral Psychology: Historical and Contemporary Readings (2010, Wiley-Blackwell), co-edited with Thomas Nadelhoffer and Shaun Nichols
• The Natural Method: Essays on Mind, Ethics, and Self in Honor of Owen Flanagan (2020, MIT Press), co-edited with Wenqing Zhao and Thomas Polger
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